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Abstract: We study the design of mechanisms in combinatorial auction domains. We focus on settings
where the auction is repeated, motivated by auctions for licenses or advertising space. We consider
models of agent behaviour in which they either apply common learning techniques to minimize the
regret of their bidding strategies, or apply short-sighted best-response strategies. We ask: when can a
black-box approximation algorithm for the base auction problem be converted into a mechanism that
approximately preserves the original algorithm’s approximation factor on average over many iterations?
We present a general reduction for a broad class of algorithms when agents minimize external regret.
We also present a new mechanism for the combinatorial auction problem that attains an O(
√
m) ap-
proximation on average when agents apply best-response dynamics.
Keywords: Combinatorial Auctions; Mechanisms; Regret-minimization; Best-response
1 Introduction
We consider problems in the combinatorial auc-
tion (CA) domain, where m objects are to be al-
located among n potential buyers in order to max-
imize total value, subject to problem-specific fea-
sibility constraints. These packing problems are
complicated by game-theoretic issues: the buyers
might benefit from misrepresenting their values to
an allocation algorithm. This prompts us to design
mechanisms that use payments to encourage rea-
sonable behaviour. The well-known VCG mech-
anism solves incentive issues by inducing truth-
telling as a dominant strategy, but is infeasible for
computationally intractible problems. Indeed, for
many interesting problems (such as combinatorial
auctions), there are large gaps between the best-
known approximation factors attainable by effi-
cient truthful mechanisms and those possible in
purely computational settings. For some problems,
these large gaps are essential [25].
In this paper we consider the problem of design-
ing mechanisms that implement approximations to
combinatorial auction problems without the use
of dominant-strategy truthfulness. We are moti-
vated by the domain of repeated auctions, where
an auction problem is resolved multiple times with
the same objects and bidders. These include, for
example, auctions for advertising spaces or slots
[13], bandwidth auctions (such as the FCC spec-
trum auction), airline landing rights auctions [10],
etc. In these settings a mechanism for the (one-
shot) auction problem corresponds to a repeated
game to be played by the agents.1
The question of how to model agent behaviour
in repeated games has been studied extensively in
the economic and algorithmic game theory liter-
ature (see chapters 17-21 of [24] and references
therein). Many proposed models suppose that
agents choose strategies (or distributions there-
over) at equilibrium, where no agent has incentive
to unilaterally deviate. There are, however, a num-
ber of reasons to believe such models are unrealis-
tic: in general equilibria are computationally hard
to find, and may not exist without the presence of
agents who randomize over strategies for no rea-
son other than to preserve the stability of the sys-
tem. Even when pure equilibria exist, agents may
not necessarily converge to an equilibrium (of the
single-round game) or agree on which equilibrium
1A simple extension allows preferences and participants to
change over time, but sufficiently slowly compared to the rate
of auction repetition. Our results should extend easily to such
settings.
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(of the extended-form game) to choose. Such con-
cerns have also been noted elsewhere [4, 14].
We will instead focus our attention on two mod-
els of agent behaviour that do not make equilib-
rium assumptions, and have gained recent interest
in the algorithmic game theory literature. In the
first model, agents can play arbitrary sequences
of strategies for the repeated auction, under the
assumption that they obtain low regret relative to
the best fixed strategy in hindsight. More pre-
cisely, the average external regret of such a bidder
must tend to 0 as the number of auction rounds in-
creases. These regret-minimizing bidders can be
seen as agents that learn how to bid intelligently
(relative to any fixed strategy benchmark) from the
bidding history of past auction iterations. Note that
we require no assumptions about the synchrony or
asynchrony of updates; arbitrary sets of agents can
update their strategies concurrently. The regret-
minimization assumption is realistic because sim-
ple, efficient algorithms exist that minimize exter-
nal regret for linear optimization problems such
as repeated auctions [19, 20]. Under this model,
our goal is to design an auction mechanism that
achieves an approximation to the optimal social
welfare on average over sufficiently many rounds
of the repeated auction. This is precisely the prob-
lem of designing a mechanism with bounded price
of total anarchy, as introduced by Blum et al [4].
In the second model, we assume that agents
choose myopic best-response strategies to the cur-
rent strategies of the other agents. Such bid-
ding behaviour is best motivated in settings where
agents update their declarations asynchronously
(ie. not concurrently). We therefore model this
behaviour as follows: on each auction round, an
agent is chosen uniformly at random, and that
agent is given the opportunity to change his strat-
egy to the current myopic best-response. Under
this model, our goal again is to design auction
mechanisms that achieve approximations to the
best possible social welfare on average over suffi-
ciently many auction rounds, with high probability
over the random choices of bidders. This is closely
related to the concept of the price of (myopic) sink-
ing, as introduced by Goemans et al [14].
Our high-level goal is to decouple computa-
tional issues from incentives issues. A full (and ad-
mittedly ambitious) solution in our domain would
be a black-box conversion of a given approxima-
tion algorithm into a mechanism that implements2
the same approximation ratio, on average over suf-
ficiently many auction rounds, given our model of
bidder behaviour. Our primary research question,
partially addressed herein, is to what extent such
implementations are possible.
1.1 Our Contribution
We design mechanisms that are based on a par-
ticular class of approximation algorithms for com-
binatorial auction problems: those that are mono-
tone and satisfy the loser-independence property.
An algorithm is monotone if, whenever a bidder
can win some set S by declaring a value of v for
it, then he could also win any subset of S with
any declared value at least v. This monotonic-
ity condition characterizes truthfulness when bid-
ders are single-minded (meaning that each agent
has value for only a single set), but not for gen-
eral auction problems [22]. Roughly speaking, an
algorithm is loser-independent if the outcome for
an agent depends only on those agents who would
win if he did not participate, and on their declared
values for their winnings. This extends a notion
of loser-independence for single-parameter prob-
lems, introduced by Chekuri and Gamzu [8], to
general auction problems. Many interesting algo-
rithms satisfy these properties, including greedy
algorithms for CAs [22] and convex bundle auc-
tions [1], primal-dual algorithms for unsplittable
flow [7], and others.
Our first main result is that any monotone loser-
independent c-approximate algorithm can be im-
plemented as a mechanism with price of total an-
archy at most c(1 + o(1)). Our mechanism is a
black-box reduction from an algorithm for a one-
shot auction iteration, and the same mechanism is
applied each auction round. The form of our mech-
anism is very simple: on each round, it applies a
simple modification to the bidders’ declarations,
then runs the approximation algorithm on the mod-
ified declarations and charges critical prices (i.e.
an agent who wins a set pays the smallest amount
he could have declared for that set and won it,
given the declarations of the other bidders).
2Throughout the paper we use “implement” in the economic
sense of obtaining the desired properties when used by rational
agents.
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Our implementation does not depend on the spe-
cific algorithms used by the agents to minimize
their regret; only that their regret vanishes as the
number of rounds increases. The rate of conver-
gence to our approximation bound will depend on
the rate at which the agents’ regret vanishes.
We demonstrate that our mechanism is resilient
to the presence of byzantine agents, in the fol-
lowing sense. If each agent either applies regret-
minimizing strategies or makes arbitrary declara-
tions (but never declares more than his true value
for a set), then the mechanism attains a c(1 +
o(1)) approximation to the optimal welfare obtain-
able by the regret-minimizing bidders. The no-
overbidding assumption is necessary (as otherwise
a byzantine agent could bid arbitrarily highly and
prevent any welfare from being obtained) and re-
alistic, since we can view byzantine players as not
understanding how to participate intelligently in
the auction and thus likely to bid conservatively.
We conjecture that the mechanism described
above also implements an O(c) approximation,
on average over sufficiently many rounds, in the
model of best-response bidders. Whether this is so
is an important open question.
We then focus specifically on the general com-
binatorial auction problem in the best-response
model. Specifically, we present a mechanism that
implements an O(s) approximation for combina-
torial auctions with set allocations of size at most
s, then extend this to a mechanism that implements
an O(
√
m) approximation for general combinato-
rial auctions. Note that this approximation fac-
tor is the best possible, in that we attain it with
high probability after polynomially many auction
rounds (in fact, only a slightly superlinear num-
ber of rounds). We point out that while truth-
ful mechanisms with similar approximation ratios
are known for single-minded combinatorial auc-
tions, our results are significant improvements over
what is known to be achieveable with deterministic
truthful algorithms.
Our results require a mild game-theoretic as-
sumption, which is that bidders will not apply
strategies that are (strictly) dominated by easily-
found alternatives. This is precisely the assump-
tion of algorithmically undominated strategies, as
introduced by Babaioff et al [2]. Additionally,
the mechanism for best-response bidders also ap-
plies a technique known in implementation the-
ory as virtual implementation, where an alterna-
tive social choice rule is applied with vanishingly
small probability [18]. We view this not as an in-
troduction of randomness into the algorithm be-
ing implemented, but rather as the introduction
of a trembling-hand consideration into the solu-
tion concept that encourages reasonable behaviour
when best-response agents must distinguish be-
tween otherwise equally beneficial strategies.
1.2 Regret Minimization
We now describe the concept of external regret
minimization in further detail. The external regret
of a sequence of declarations is the difference be-
tween the average utility of an agent (i.e. value
of goods received minus payment extracted) and
the maximum average utility that could have been
obtained by a single fixed declaration made each
round. An algorithm for generating declarations is
regret-minimizing if its regret vanishes as a func-
tion of the number of auction rounds.
A simple and efficient algorithm due to Kalai
and Vempala [20] minimizes regret for linear op-
timization problems, even when the strategy space
has exponential size. The algorithm requires ac-
cess to an exact best-response oracle. Kakade et
al [19] show how to use a γ-approximate best re-
sponse oracle to achieve a γ-approximation to the
best fixed declaration in hindsight.
The regret-minimization mechanism we con-
struct in this paper will reduce the strategic choices
of bidders to a simple linear optimization prob-
lem, so that the algorithms described above can
be used by agents to minimize external regret.
This requires access to best-response oracles for
the approximation algorithms being implemented.
The ability to compute best-response choices is
also a necessary component for the setting of best-
response bidders, where the best-response assump-
tion certainly requires that such strategies can be
found efficiently. It is easy to compute best-
responses when agents choose between only poly-
nomially many strategies (such as, for example,
when each agent’s true valuation is a combina-
tion of polynomially many desired bundles). In
general, however, the problem of computing best-
response is non-trivial when agents have exponen-
tially many strategic choices; we leave the con-
struction of such oracles to the creators of particu-
3
lar auction mechanisms.
1.3 Related Work
Truthful mechanisms for the combinatorial auc-
tion problem have been extensively studied. For
general CAs, Hastad’s well-known inapproxima-
bility result [16] shows that it is hard to approx-
imate the problem to within Ω(
√
m) assuming
NP 6= ZPP . The best known deterministic
truthful mechanism for CAs with general valua-
tions attains an approximation ratio of O( m√
logm
)
[17]. A randomized O(√m)-approximate mech-
anism that is truthful in expectation was given
by Lavi and Swamy [21]. Dobzinski, Nisan and
Schapira [12] then gave an O(√m)-approximate
universally truthful randomized mechanism.
Many variations on the combinatorial auction
problem have been considered in the literature.
Bartal et. al. [3] give a truthful O(m 1B−2 )
mechanism for multi-unit combinatorial auctions
with B copies of each object, for all B ≥ 3.
Dobzinski and Nisan [11] construct a truthful 2-
approximate mechanism for multi-unit auctions.
Many other problems have truthful mechansisms
([7, 22, 23]) when bidders are restricted to being
single-minded. In [5] the authors study the limited
power of certain classes of greedy algorithms for
truthfully approximating CA problems.
The problem of designing combinatorial auc-
tion mechanisms that implement approximations
at equilibria (and, in particular, Bayes-Nash equi-
libria for partial information settings) was consid-
ered in [9] for submodular CAs, and in [6] for gen-
eral CA problems. Implementation at equilibrium,
especially for the alternative goal of profit maxi-
mization, has a rich history in the economics liter-
ature; see, for example, Jackson [18] for a survey.
The study of regret-minimization goes back to
the work of Hannan on repeated two-player games
[15]. Kalai and Vempala [20] extend the work
of Hannan to online optimization problems, and
Kakade et al [19] further extend to settings of ap-
proximate regret minimization. Blum et al [4] ap-
ply regret-minimization to the study of inefficiency
in repeated games, coining the phrase “price of to-
tal anarchy” for the worst-case ratio between the
optimal objective value and the average objective
value when agents minimize regret.
Properties of best-response dynamics in re-
peated games, and especially the question of con-
vergence to a pure equilibrium, is well-studied (see
Chapter 19 of [24]). The study of average perfor-
mance of best-response dynamics as a metric of
game inefficiency, the so-called “price of sinking,”
was introduced by Goemanns et al [14].
Babaioff et al [2] study implementation of al-
gorithms in undominated strategies, which is a re-
laxation of the dominant strategy truthfulness con-
cept. They focus on a variant of the CA problem in
which agents are assumed to have “single-value”
valuations, and present a mechanism to implement
such auctions in a multi-round fashion. By com-
parison, mechanisms in our proposed model solve
each instance of an auction in a one-shot manner,
and our solution concept assumes that the auction
is repeated multiple times.
2 Model and Definitions
In general we will use boldface to represent vec-
tors, subscript i to denote the ith component, and
subscript −i to denote all components except i, so
that, for example, v = (vi,v−i).
We consider the domain of combinatorial auc-
tion problems, where n agents desires subsets of
a set M of m objects. An allocation profile is
a collection of subsets X1, . . . , Xn, where Xi is
thought of as the subset allocated to agent i. A
particular problem instance is defined by the set of
feasible allocation profiles that are permitted; for
example, the general combinatorial auction prob-
lem requires that all allocated subsets be disjoint.
Each agent i has a privately-held valuation func-
tion ti : 2M → R, his type, that assigns a value
to each allocation. We assume that valuation func-
tions are monotone and normalized so that v(∅) =
0. A valuation function v is single-minded if there
exists S ⊆ M and x ≥ 0 such that v(T ) = x if
S ⊆ T and v(T ) = 0 otherwise. We will write
∅ for the zero valuation, and (S, x) for a single-
minded declaration for S at value x.
An allocation rule A assigns to each valuation
profile v a feasible outcomeA(v); we writeAi(v)
for the allocation to agent i. We writeA for both an
allocation rule and an algorithm that implements it.
An allocation rule is loser-independent if, when-
ever v−i, v′−i satisfy A(∅,v−i) = A(∅,v′−i) and
vj(Aj(∅,v−i)) = vj(Aj(∅,v′−i)) for all j 6= i,
then A(vi,v−i) = A(vi,v′−i). In other words,
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agent i’s perception of the behaviour ofA depends
only on those agents who would win if agent i did
not participate, and on their declared values for
their winnings.
A payment rule P assigns a vector of n pay-
ments to each valuation profile. A direct revela-
tion mechanism M is composed of an allocation
ruleA and a payment rule P . The mechanism pro-
ceeds by eliciting a valuation profile d of decla-
rations from the agents, then applying the alloca-
tion and payment rules to d. The utility of agent
i for mechanism M, given declaration profile d,
is ui(d) = ti(Ai(d)) − Pi(d). We think of each
agent as wanting to choose di to maximize ui(d).
The social welfare obtained by allocation pro-
file X, given type profile t, is SW (X, t) =∑
i ti(Xi). Given fixed type profile t, we write
SWopt for maxX{SW (X, t)}, and SWA(d) =∑
i ti(A(d)). When D = (d1,d2, . . . ,dT )
is a sequence of valuation profiles, we write
SWA(D) = 1T
∑
t SWA(d
t) for the average wel-
fare obtained over all declarations in D. We will
sometimes replace subscript A by M, in which
case the social welfare is for the allocation rule of
M. Note that algorithm A is a c-approximation if
SWA(t) ≥ 1cSWopt for all t.
Given allocation rule A, agent i, declara-
tion profile d−i, and set S, the critical price
θAi (S,d−i) for S is the minimum value that agent
i could bid on set S and be allocated S by A
given fixed d−i. That is, θi(S,d−i) = inf{v :
∃di, di(S) = v,Ai(di,d−i) = S}.
We say that a declaration di is weakly dominated
by declaration di′ for agent i if ui(di,d−i) ≤
ui(di
′,d−i) for all d−i, and ui(di,d−i) <
ui(di
′,d−i) for some d−i.
Declaration sequence D = (d0,d1, . . . ,dT )
minimizes external regret for agent i if, for
any fixed declaration di,
∑
t ui(di
t,dt−i) ≥∑
t ui(di,d
t
−i)+o(T ). That is, the utility of agent
i approaches the utility of the optimal fixed strat-
egy in hindsight.
Declaration sequence D = (d0,d1, . . . ,dT )
is an instance of response dynamics if, for all
1 ≤ t ≤ T , profiles dt−1 and dt differ on the
declaration of at most one player. Response dy-
namics D is an instance of best-response dynam-
ics if, whenever dt−1 and dt differ on the dec-
laration of agent i, dti maximizes agent i’s utility
Mechanism MA:
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. d′ ← SIMPLIFY(d).
2. Allocate A(d′), charge critical prices.
Procedure SIMPLIFY:
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. For each i ∈ [n]:
2. Choose Si ∈ argmaxS{di(S)}, breaking
ties in favour of smaller sets.
3. di′ ← (Si, di(Si)).
4. Return (d′1, . . . , d′n).
Figure 1: Mechanism for regret-minimizing bidders,
based on monotone algorithm A. Uses subprocedure
SIMPLIFY.
given the declarations of the other bidders. That
is, dti ∈ argmaxd{ui(d,dt−i)}.
3 Regret-Minimizing Bidders
In this section we prove that if agents avoid al-
gorithmically dominated strategies and minimize
external regret, then a loser-independent monotone
algorithm A can be converted into a mechanism
with almost no loss to its average approximation
ratio over many rounds. The mechanism, MA, is
described in Figure 1. Mechanism MA proceeds
by first simplifying the declaration given by each
agent, then passing the simplified declarations to
algorithm A. The resulting allocation is paired
with a payment scheme that charges critical prices.
The simplification process SIMPLIFY essen-
tially converts any declaration into a single-minded
declaration (and does not affect declarations that
are already single-minded). We will therefore as-
sume without loss of generality that agents make
single-minded declarations, as additional informa-
tion is not used by the mechanism.3
Fix a particular combinatorial auction problem
and type profile t, and let A be some monotone
approximation algorithm. Let d be a declaration
3We note, however, that this is not the same as assuming
that agents are single-minded; our results hold for bidders with
general private valuations.
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profile; we suppose each di is a single-minded bid
for set Si. We draw the following conclusion about
the bidding choices of rational agents.
Lemma 3.1. Declaration di is an undominated
strategy for agent i if and only if di(Si) = ti(Si).
Proof. For all d−i, MA(di,d−i) either allocates
Si or ∅ to agent i. Thus agent i’s utility for declar-
ing di, ui(di,d−i), is ti(Si)−θMAi (Si,d−i) when
di(Si) > θ
MA
i (Si,d−i), and 0 otherwise. A dec-
laration of di(Si) = ti(S) therefore maximizes
ui(di,d−i) for all d−i.
On the other hand, if di(Si) 6= ti(Si), let di′
be the single-minded declaration for Si at value
ti(Si). Then for any d−i such that θiA(Si,d−i)
lies between di(Si) and ti(Si), ui(di′,d−i) >
ui(di,d−i). For simplicity we will assume such
a d−i exists; handling the general case requires
only a technical and uninteresting extension of no-
tation4. Thus declaration di′ weakly dominates
declaration di.
One implication of Lemma 3.1 is that the strate-
gic choice of an agent participating in mechanism
MA reduces to a linear optimization problem. On
each round, we can think of agent i as choosing
set Si, which is the set he will attempt to win that
round. Once Si is chosen, an undominated decla-
ration for agent i is determined: the single-minded
declaration for Si at value ti(Si). Given that agent
i chooses set Si, his utility will be ti(Si) − wi,
where wi = min{ti(Si), θAi (Si,d−i)} is the price
for set Si, determined by the declarations of the
other agents, capped at ti(Si). Thus, since utilities
are linear in the choice of Si, agents can indeed
apply the regret-minimization algorithm of Kalai
and Vempala [20] to choose strategies that mini-
mize external regret.
We now proceed with bounding the social wel-
fare obtained by MA. Let A1, . . . , An be an op-
timal assignment for types t. Suppose that D =
d
1, . . . ,dT is a sequence of declarations to our
mechanism. The definition of regret minimization
then immediately implies the following.
4If θiA(Si,d−i) never lies between di(Si) and ti(Si))
for any d−i, then MA(di,d−i) = MA(di′,d−i) for all
d−i, so di and di′ are equivalent strategies. We can therefore
think of di as being “the same” as a single-minded declaration
for Si at value ti(Si). We will ignore this technical issue for
the remainder of the paper, in the interest of keeping the expo-
sition simple.
Lemma 3.2. If agent i minimizes his external re-
gret in bid sequence D, then 1T
∑
t(ti(A(dt)) +
θi
A(Ai,dt−i)) ≥ ti(Ai)− o(1).
Assume now that algorithm A is loser indepen-
dent. We can then relate the value of the solution
returned by an algorithm to the critical prices of
the sets in an optimal solution.
Lemma 3.3. IfA is a monotone loser-independent
c-approximate algorithm, then
∑
i di(A(d)) ≥
1
c
∑
i θ
A
i (Ai,d−i).
Proof. Choose some ǫ > 0. For each i,
let di′ be the pointwise maximum between di
and the single-minded declaration for set Ai
at value θAi (Ai,d−i) − ǫ. The loser inde-
pendence property implies that we can per-
form this operation independently for each agent
(i.e. without affecting critical prices), and
moreover A(d′) = A(d). Since A is
a c-approximate algorithm,
∑
i di
′(A(d′)) ≥
1
c
∑
i di
′(Ai) ≥ 1c
∑
i(θ
A
i (Ai,d−i) − ǫ). Addi-
tionally, since di′(T ) = di(T ) whenever di(T ) ≥
θAi (T,d−i) (from the definition of di′), we have
di
′(A(d′)) = di(A(d)) for all i. We conclude
that
∑
i di(A(d)) ≥ 1c
∑
i(θ
A
i (Ai,d−i) − ǫ) for
all ǫ > 0, as required.
We are now ready to proceed with the proof of
our main result in this section.
Theorem 3.4. Any monotone loser-independent c-
approximate algorithm can be implemented as a
mechanism with c+ 1 price of total anarchy.
Proof. Let D = d1, . . . ,dT be a sequence of
declarations in which all agents minimize exter-
nal regret. By Lemma 3.2, 1T
∑
t(ti(A(dt)) +
θAi (Ai,d
t
−i)) ≥ ti(Ai)− o(1). Summing over all
i, we have 1T
∑
t
∑
i(ti(A(dt))+θAi (Ai,dt−i)) ≥
SWOPT − (n)(o(1)). By Lemma 3.3, this implies
1
T
∑
t
∑
i(ti(A(dt))+cdti(A(dt))) ≥ SWOPT −
(n)(o(1)). We know dti(A(dt)) = ti(A(dt)) for
all i and t by Lemma 3.1, so we conclude (c +
1) 1T
∑
t
∑
i ti(A(dt)) ≥ SWOPT − (n)(o(1)).
Since the term hidden by the asymptotic notation
vanishes with T and does not depend on n, we ob-
tain the desired result.
Theorem 3.4 is very general, as it applies to
a number of different problem settings in which
6
loser-independent monotone approximation algo-
rithms are known. As a few particular examples,
Theorem 3.4 yields an O(
√
m) implementation of
the combinatorial auction problem [22], an s + 1
implementation of the combinatorial auction prob-
lem where sets are restricted to cardinality s (using
a simple greedy algorithm), an O(m1/(B−1)) im-
plementation of the unsplittable flow problem with
minimum edge capacity B [7], and an O(R4/3)
implementation of the combinatorial auction of
convex bundles in the plane where R is the maxi-
mum aspect ratio over all desired bundles [1].
We note that, since agents experience no regret
at a pure Nash equilibrium, an immediate corol-
lary to Theorem 3.4 is that any monotone loser-
independent c-approximate algorithm can be im-
plemented as a mechanism with c + 1 price of
anarchy. We remark that an alternative proof of
this result has been given recently using a different
mechanism construction [6].
Also, the rate at which the welfare obtained by
MA converges to an average that is a c + 1 ap-
proximation to optimal depends on the rate of con-
vergence of players’ external regret to 0. The av-
erage welfare obtained after T rounds will have an
additive loss of (n)(r(T )), where r(T ) is the aver-
age regret experienced by an agent after T rounds.
Assuming that agents apply algorithms that mini-
mize regret at a rate of r(T ) = o(1/
√
T ), which is
easily attainable using the algorithm of Kalai and
Vempala [20], the additive error term is at most a
constant when T is at least quadratic in n.
3.1 Resilience to Byzantine Agents
Suppose that in addition to regret-minimizing
agents, the auction participants include byzantine
agents. The only restriction we impose on the be-
haviour of such agents is that they do not overbid
on any set; that is di(S) ≤ ti(S) for any S and
byzantine agent i. We can motivate this restric-
tion either through our characterization of undom-
inated strategies in Lemma 3.1, or by thinking of
byzantine players as not understanding how to par-
ticipate rationally in the auction, and hence likely
to be conservative in the way that they participate.
Under this assumption, since Lemma 3.3 holds for
any declaration profile, we easily obtain the fol-
lowing generalization to Theorem 3.4.
Proposition 3.5. Suppose A is a monotone loser-
independent c-approximate algorithm and D is a
declaration sequence forMA. IfN ⊆ [n] is a col-
lection of agents that minimize regret inD, and the
remaining agents never bid more than their true
values on any set in D, then 1T
∑
t SWA(d
t) ≥
1
c+1
∑
i∈N SWopt + |N |(o(1)).
3.2 Importance of Loser-Independence
We note that the loser independence property is
necessary for Theorem 3.4, as the following exam-
ple demonstrates.
Example 3.6. Consider an auction problem in
which no agent can be allocated more than s ob-
jects, and moreoever M = A ∪ B where |A| =
|B| = m/2 and the mechanism must either allo-
cate objects in A or objects in B, but not both.
Consider the algorithm that takes the maximum
over two solutions: a greedy assignment of sub-
sets of A, and a greedy assignment of subsets of
B. This algorithm obtains an s+1 approximation.
Consider now an instance of the problem in
which a single agent desires all of B with value
1, and each of m/2 agents desires a separate sin-
gleton in A with value 1 − ǫ. Suppose that the
agent desiring B declares his valuation truthfully,
but the other agents declare the zero valuation. On
this input, the algorithm under consideration ob-
tains only an m/2 approximation to the optimal
solution. However, this set of declarations forms a
Nash equilibrium, and hence each agent has zero
regret under this input profile. Thus, even if agents
minimize their regret, our mechanism may obtain a
very poor approximation to the optimal social wel-
fare over arbitrarily many auction rounds.
4 Best-Response Agents
In this section we consider the problem of de-
signing mechanisms for agents that apply myopic
best-response strategies asynchronously. Recall
that in our model agents are chosen for update uni-
formly at random, one per round. In order to keep
our exposition clear, we will make two additional
assumptions about the nature of the best-response
behaviour (which can be removed, as we discuss
below). First, we will suppose that in the ini-
tial state every bidder makes the empty declaration
∅. Second, we suppose that if a bidder is chosen
for update but cannot improve his utility, he will
7
choose to maintain his previous strategy. These
assumptions will simplify the process of charac-
terizing best-response strategies of agents, and in
particular the statement of Lemma 4.3 in the next
section. It is possible to remove these assumptions,
at the cost of a minor modification to the mecha-
nisms we propose. We defer a more complete dis-
cussion to the appendix.
A simple example shows that mechanism MA
may not converge to a Nash equilibrium via best-
response dynamics; this example is presented in
the appendix. We conjecture that, on average, the
best-response dynamics on mechanism MA ob-
tains a good approximation to the optimal social
welfare.
Conjecture 4.1. If A is a monotone loser-
independent c-approximate algorithm, then MA
has O(c) price of (myopic) sinking.
As partial progress toward resolving Conjecture
4.1, we construct alternative mechanisms that are
more amenable to best-response analysis. These
mechanisms are tailored specifically to the general
combinatorial auction problem, and combinatorial
auctions with cardinality-restricted sets. Our hope
is to demonstrate the intuition behind Conjecture
4.1 and explore mechanism design tools that may
prove useful in its resolution.
The primary tool we will use is the following
probabilistic lemma, which pertains to any mech-
anism in a best-response setting. Suppose M is a
mechanism, and D is a sequence of best-response
declarations for M. For any d, let P1(d) =
P1(d−i) be some property of d that does not de-
pend on di, and let P2(d) = P2(di) be some prop-
erty depending only on di.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose that, for any d, if P1(d−i)
is false, then any best response by agent i, di,
satisfies P2(di). Then for all ǫ > 0, if best-
response dynamics is run for T > ǫ−1n steps,
there will be at least (12 − ǫ)T steps t for which
either P1(dt−i) or P2(di
t) is true, with probability
at least 1− e−Tǫ2/32n.
Proof (sketch). Let Bti be the event that neither
P1(d
t
−i) nor P2(di
t) is true, and let Ati denote the
event that P2(dit) is true. Our goal is to bound the
number of occurrances of Bti .
Note that if Bti occurs and agent i is chosen for
update on step t+1, thenAt+1i occurs (by assump-
tion). Alternatively, if Ati occurs but agent i is not
chosen for update on step t+ 1 then At+1i occurs,
since Ai depends only on the declaration of agent
i. Thus eventsAti andBti can be compared to a ran-
dom walk on {0, 1}, where at each step the current
state changes with probability 1/n. The number
of occurrances of Bti is dominated by the num-
ber of occurrances of 0 in such a random walk.
A straightforward application of the method of
bounded average differences shows that this value
is concentrated around its expectation, which is at
most T2 +
n
2 . Thus, as long as T > ǫ
−1n, the
number of occurrances of Bti will be concentrated
at T (12 + ǫ), giving the desired bound. Additional
details are deferred to the appendix.
4.1 A Mechanism for s-CAs
Consider the s-CA problem, which is a combi-
natorial auction in which no agent can be allocated
more than s objects. An algorithm that greedily as-
signs sets in descending order by value obtains an
(s+1) approximation.5 Call this algorithmAsCA.
We will construct a mechanism MsCA based on
AsCA; it is described in Figure 2. This algorithm
simplifies incoming bids (in the same way asMA)
and runs algorithm AsCA to find a potential allo-
cation. However, an additional condition for in-
clusion in the solution is imposed: the value de-
clared for a set must be larger than the sum of all
bids for intersecting sets. Potential allocations that
satisfy this condition are allocated, and the mech-
anism charges critical prices (that is, the smallest
value at which an agent would be allocated their
set by MsCA, which is not necessarily the same
as the critical price for AsCA).
We note that since our mechanism implements
a monotone algorithm and charges critical prices,
Lemma 3.1 implies that undominated strategies for
agent i involve choosing a set Si and making a
single-minded bid for Si at value ti(Si). We will
therefore assume that agents bid in this way.
Suppose that d is a declaration profile, where
each di is single-minded for Si. For any set T , de-
fine Ri(d, T ) = {j : j 6= i, Sj ∩ T 6= ∅}. We also
define Qi(d, T ) = {j : j ∈ Ri(d, T ), dj(Sj) <
ti(T )}. That is, Ri is the set of bidders other than
5And an s approximation for single-minded declarations.
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Mechanism MsCA:
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. d′ ← SIMPLIFY(d), say di′ = (Si, vi)
2. (T1, . . . , Tn)← AsCA(d′).
3. For each i such that Ti 6= ∅:
4. R← {j : Sj ∩ Ti 6= ∅}.
5. pi ←
∑
j∈R dj(Sj).
6. If di′(Ti) ≤ pi, set Ti ← ∅, pi ← 0.
7. Allocate T1, . . . , Tn, charge critical prices.
Figure 2: Mechanism MsCA, an implementation of
greedy algorithm AsCA for the s-CA problem.
i whose single-minded declared sets intersect T ,
andQi is the subset of those bidders whose single-
minded declared values are less than agent i’s true
value for T . We then say that d is separated for
agent i if
∑
j∈Qi(d,Si) dj(Sj) ≤ di(Si) and d is
separated if it is separated for every bidder. Since
an agent gains positive utility only if the declara-
tion is separated for him, and since the intial state
is the empty declaration profile (which is sepa-
rated), we draw the following conclusion.
Lemma 4.3. At each step of the best-response
dynamics for mechanism MsCA, the declaration
profile submitted by the agents will be separated.
For the remainder of the section we will assume
that declaration profiles are separated. Under this
assumption, the behaviour of mechanism MsCA
simplifies in a fortuitous way.
Proposition 4.4. If d is separated, then MsCA
allocates Si to agent i precisely when di(Si) >
maxj∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj).
Proof. If di(Si) > maxj∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj),
then Si is allocated by AsCA(d). Fur-
thermore Qi(Si,d) = Ri(Si,d), so
di(Si) >
∑
j∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj) implies
di(Si) >
∑
j∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj) and hence Si
will be allocated by MsCA. On the other hand,
if di(Si) ≤ maxj∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj), then cer-
tainly di(Si) ≤
∑
j∈Ri(Si,d) dj(Sj) so Si is not
allocated by MsCA.
Let A1, . . . , An be an optimal allocation with
respect to the agents’ true types t.
Proposition 4.5. If d is separated and∑
j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj) <
1
2 ti(Ai), then any
utility-maximizing declaration for agent i, di, will
be a single-minded declaration for some Si with
di(Si) ≥ 12 ti(Ai).
For declaration profile d, let G denote the set of
agents i for which either
∑
j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj) >
1
2 ti(Ai) or di(Si) ≥ 12 ti(Ai). We now bound the
social welfare obtained by MsCA with respect to
the optimal assignment to agents in G.
Lemma 4.6.
SWMsCA(d) ≥
1
4(s+ 1)
∑
i∈G
ti(Ai).
We are now ready to bound the average social
welfare of our mechanism, over sufficiently many
rounds, with respect to the approximation factor of
algorithmA.
Theorem 4.7. Choose ǫ > 0 and suppose D =
d1, . . . , dT is an instance of best-response dynam-
ics with random player order, where agents play
undominated strategies, and T > ǫ−1n. Then
SWMsCA(D) ≥
(
1
8(s+ 1)
− ǫ
)
SWopt(t)
with probability at least 1− ne−Tǫ2/32n.
Proof. Let Gt be the set of agents G from Lemma
4.6 on step t (i.e. with respect to declaration
d
t). Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 4.5 together im-
ply that each agent i will be in Gt for at least
(12 − ǫ)T values of t, with probability at least
1− e−Tǫ2/32n. The union bound then implies that
this occurs for every agent with probability at least
1 − ne−Tǫ2/32n. Conditioning on the occurrance
of this event, Lemma 4.6 implies
SWMsCA(D) =
1
T
∑
t
SWMsCA(d
t)
≥ 1
4(s+ 1)T
∑
t
∑
i∈Gt
ti(Ai)
≥ 1
4(s+ 1)T
∑
i
(
T
2
− ǫ
)
ti(Ai)
≥
(
1
8(s+ 1)
− ǫ
)
SWopt(t)
which implies the required bound.
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Mechanism MCA:
Input: Declaration profile d = d1, . . . , dn.
1. d′ ← SIMPLIFY(d), say di′ = (Si, vi)
2. With probability γ:
3. For all i with Si = M , di′ ← ∅.
4. Let (T1, . . . , Tn)←M√mCA(d′).
5. If ∃i : Si =M :
6. Let j ← argmaxj{d′j(M) : Sj =M}.
7. If d′j(Sj) >
∑
k 6=j:Sk=M d
′
k(Sk) and
d′j(Sj) >
∑
i d
′
i(Ti):
8. Set Tj ←M , Ti ← ∅ for all i 6= j
9. Allocate T1, . . . , Tn, charge critical prices.
Figure 3: Mechanism MCA, a best-response implemen-
tation of a greedy algorithm for the CA problem. Param-
eter γ > 0 is an arbitrarily small positive constant. Note
M√mCA is MsCA from Figure 2 with s =
√
m.
Taking, say, ǫ = 0.1, and assuming T >> n,
we conclude that SWMsCA(D) > 1O(s)SWopt(t)
with high probability. ThusMsCA implements an
O(s) approximation to the s-CA problem for best-
response bidders.
4.2 A Mechanism for General CAs
Consider the following algorithm for the general
CA problem: try greedily assigning sets, of size at
most
√
m, by value; return either the resulting so-
lution or the allocation that gives all items to a sin-
gle agent, whichever has higher welfare. This al-
gorithm is anO(
√
m) approximation [23]. We will
construct a mechanism MCA based on this algo-
rithm; it is described in Figure 3. MCA essentially
implements two copies of MsCA: one for sets of
size at most
√
m (which we will call M√mCA),
and one for allocating all objects to a single bidder;
it then takes the maximum of the two solutions. We
add one additional modification: with vanishingly
small probability γ, MCA ignores bids for M and
behaves as M√mCA. The purpose of this modifi-
cation is to encourage agents to bid on small sets,
even when the presence of a high-valued bid for
a large set would seem to indicate that bidding on
small sets is fruitless.
The analysis of the average social welfare ob-
tained by MCA closely follows the analysis for
MsCA. Our high-level approach is to apply this
analysis twice: once for allocations of sets of size
at most
√
m, and once for allocations of all objects
to a single bidder. The primary complicating fac-
tor is that the bidding choice of an agent may be
influenced by the mechanism’s choice of whether
or not to allocate M to a single bidder; this can be
handled by a careful analysis of utility-maximizing
declarations. We defer all details to the appendix.
The final result is the following.
Theorem 4.8. Choose ǫ > 0 and suppose D =
d1, . . . , dT is an instance of best-response dynam-
ics with random player order, where agents play
undominated strategies, and T > ǫ−1n. Then
SWMCA(D) ≥
(
1
O(
√
m)
− ǫ
)
SWopt(t)
with probability at least 1− 2ne−Tǫ2/32n.
We conclude that mechanismMCA implements
an O(
√
m) approximation to the combinatorial
auction problem for best-response bidders, with
high probability, whenever T >> n.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We considered the problem of designing mech-
anisms for use with regret-minimizing and best-
response bidders in repeated combinatorial auc-
tions. We presented a general black-box construc-
tion for the regret-minimization model, which im-
plements any monotone loser-independent approx-
imation algorithm. For the best-response model,
we constructed an O(
√
m)-approximate mecha-
nism for the combinatorial auction problem.
The most obvious direction for future research
is to extend our results to implement additional
algorithms. Our best-response mechanisms made
specific use of the structure of greedy CA algo-
rithms, but it seems likely that our approach can
be generalized. Another specific question of note
is whether Conjecture 4.1 is true, and the mech-
anism we proposed for regret-minimizing bidders
also yields good performance when used by best-
response bidders. Our techniques appear limited
to loser-independent algorithms; can algorithms
that are not loser-independent be implemented in
regret-minimization or best-response domains? A
broader research topic is to explore other models
for reasonable bidder behaviour, which may admit
different mechanism implementations.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3.5
Recall the statement to be proven. We suppose
A is a monotone loser-independent c-approximate
algorithm and D is a declaration sequence for
MA. If N ⊆ [n] is a collection of agents that
minimize regret in D, and the remaining agents
never bid more than their true values on any set
in D, then we must show that 1T
∑
t SWA(d
t) ≥
1
c+1
∑
i∈N ti(Ai) + |N |(o(1)) for any allocation
profile A1, . . . , An.
We proceed with the proof. By Lemma 3.2 and
summing over all i ∈ N ,∑
i∈N
ti(Ai)− |N |(o(1))
≤ 1
T
∑
t
∑
i∈N
(ti(A(dt)) + θi(Ai,dt−i))
≤ 1
T
∑
t
∑
i∈[n]
(ti(A(dt)) + θi(Ai,dt−i)).
By Lemma 3.3, this implies
1
T
∑
t
∑
i(ti(A(dt)) + cdti(A(dt))) ≥∑
i∈N ti(Ai) − |N |(o(1)). The result then
follows from the fact that dti(A(dt)) ≤ tti(A(dt))
for all i.
Appendix B: Assumptions on the Best-
Response Model
Recall that in our model of best-response dy-
namics, we assumed that in the initial state every
bidder makes the empty declaration ∅, and that if
a bidder is chosen for update but cannot improve
his utility, he will choose to maintain his previous
strategy. We used these assumptions to argue that
agents make only separated declarations when par-
ticipating in mechanismsMsCA and MCA.
These assumptions can be removed, as follows.
We can modify mechanisms MsCA and MCA so
that, with vanishingly small probability, an alter-
native allocation rule is used. This alternative rule
chooses an agent at random, and assigns him all
objects at no cost as long as the input declaration
is separated for that agent. Thus, any separated
declaration by agent i results in positive expected
utility. Then, since any non-separated declaration
by an agent results in a utility of 0 for that agent, it
must be that the utility-maximizing declaration by
any agent must be a separated declaration.
It follows that after each bidder is chosen at least
once for update, and every step thereafter, the in-
put declaration will be separated. Thus, with high
probability, every declaration after O(n log n)
steps will be separated (by the coupon-collector
problem). Lemma 4.3 will therefore hold after
O(n logn) steps of best-response dynamics, with
high probability; the remainder of the analysis can
then proceed without change.
Appendix C: Best-response Dynamics
on MA might not Converge
Consider a combinatorial auction problem
where each agent can receive at most 2 items. Let
A be the greedy allocation rule that allocates sets
greedily by value. Suppose there are 6 agents and
4 objects, say {a, b, c, d}, and that the agents’ true
valuations are given by the following set of bids
(where the value for a set not listed is taken to be
the maximum over its subsets).
player set value
1 {a, b} 4
1 {d} 6
2 {a} 2
2 {b, c} 5
3 {c} 4
4 {d} 5
Since agents 3 and 4 are single-minded, they
always maximize their utility by declaring values
truthfully, so we can assume in any sequence of
best-response moves that they do so. By contrast,
players 1 and 2 each have a strategic choice to
make each round: which of their two desired sets
should they bid upon? Note that once this decision
is made, the way to bid is determined by Lemma
3.1 (i.e. bid truthfully for the desired set). We will
now show that from each of the resulting 4 possi-
ble declaration profiles, some player has incentive
to change their declaration.
Suppose that player 1 bids for set {d} and player
2 bids for {b, c}. (Note that under the assumption
that all declarations start empty, we can reach such
a state by selecting agents for update in the or-
der 3,4,1,2,1). Then player 1 has no incentive to
change his declaration, but player 2 would benefit
by changing his bid to {a} (increasing his utility
from 1 to 2). From that state, player 1 then has in-
centive to remove his bid for {d} and instead win
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set {a, b}, also increasing his utility from 1 to 2. If
he does so, player 2’s utility becomes 0, so player
2 benefits by switching back to his bid for {b, c}.
This results in player 1 winning nothing, so player
1 gains by adding back his bid for {d}. We have
returned to the original state, and hence no reach-
able state forms an equilibrium.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 4.2
Recall the statement to be proven. We suppose
that, for any d, if P1(d−i) is true, then the best
response by agent i, di, satisfies P2(di). We then
wish to show that, for all ǫ > 0, if best-response
dynamics is run for T > ǫ−1n steps, there will be
at least (12 − ǫ)T steps t for which either P1(dt−i)
is false or P2(dit) is true, with probability at least
1− e−Tǫ2/32n.
Proof. For each t, let Bti be the event that neither
P1(d
t
−i) nor P2(di
t) is true. Let Ati denote the
event that P2(dit) is true. Note that Ati and Bti are
mutually exclusive. Consider the steps in which
either Ati or Bti occurs: let Cr denote the event
that Bti occurs on the rth step in which either Ati
or Bti occurs. We can think of the index r as repre-
senting time steps, where we skip any time step in
which neither Ati nor Bti occurs. We wish to show
Pr[
∑
r≤T Cr > (
1
2 + ǫ)T ] < e
−Tǫ2/32n
, which
implies our desired result.
Suppose that event Cr occurs; this implies that
Bti occurs, where t is the rth step on which either
Ati or B
t
i occurs. With probability 1n agent i is
chosen for update on step t + 1. Conditioning on
that event, At+1i occurs (by the assumption of the
Lemma), and hence Cr+1 does not occur. We con-
clude Pr[Cr+1|Cr] ≤ (1− 1/n).
Next suppose that event Cr does not occur; this
implies that Ati occurs, where t is the rth step on
which either Ati or Bti occurs. With probability
(1 − 1n ) agent i is not chosen for update on step
t + 1. Conditioning on that event, At+1i occurs
(since P2 depends only on the declaration of agent
i, which does not change), and hence Cr+1 does
not occur. We conclude Pr[Cr+1|¬Cr] ≤ 1/n.
Let D1, D2, . . . , DT be a random walk on
{0, 1} defined by Pr[Dr|Dr−1] = (1 − 1/n),
Pr[Dr|¬Dr−1] = 1/n, and initial condition
D0. Then
∑
r Cr is stochastically dominated by∑
rDr, and hence Pr[
∑
r Cr > (
1
2 + ǫ)T ] ≤
Pr[
∑
rDr > (
1
2 + ǫ)T ]. It will therefore suf-
fice to show that Pr[
∑
r≤T Dr > (
1
2 + ǫ)T ] <
e−Tǫ
2/32n
.
The definition of Dr yields
Pr[Dr] =
1
n
(1 − Pr[Dr]) + (1− 1
n
)Pr[Dr]
=
1
n
+ (1− 2
n
)Pr[Dr].
Solving the recurrence (with initial condition D0)
yields
Pr[Dr] =
1
2
(1− (1− 2/n)r) +D0(1− 2/n)r
=
1
2
+ (D0 − 1
2
)(1− 2/n)r.
Linearity of expectation then implies
E[
∑
r
Dr] =
1
2
T+(D0− 1
2
)
n
2
(1−(1−2/n)T−1).
From this we conclude that
E[
∑
r
Dr] <
1
2
T +
n
4
(1)
and moreover∣∣∣∣∣E
[∑
r
Dr|D0 = 1
]
−
E
[∑
r
Dr|D0 = 0
]∣∣∣∣∣ < n2 .
(2)
Let k = T/n and define random variables
F1, . . . , Fk by Fi =
∑
r∈[in,(i+1)n−1]Dr. Then
Fi ∈ [0, n] for all i, and
∑
rDr =
∑
r Fr.
Furthermore, the influence of Fi on Fi+1, . . . , Fk
is captured entirely by the value of D(i+1)n−1,
and from (2) the influence of D(i+1)n−1 on∑T
r=(i+1)nDr =
∑k
r=i+1 Fr is bounded by
n
2 .
Since the value of Fi also influences the sum∑
r Fr directly by at most n (due to its being in-
cluded in the summation), we conclude that for all
α, α′ ∈ [0, n],
E

∑
j
Fj |F1, . . . , Fi−1, Fi = α

−
E

∑
j
Fj |F1, . . . , Fi−1, Fi = α′

 ≤ 3n/2
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Thus, by the method of bounded average differ-
ences, we conclude that
Pr

∑
j
Fj > E

∑
j
Fj

+ (ǫ/2)T


≤e−(Tǫ/2)2/2(3n/2)2k < e−Tǫ2/32n.
Since T > ǫ−1n, we have that E[
∑
j Fj ] +
(ǫ/2)T ≤ 12T + n4 + (ǫ/2)T < (12 + ǫ2 )T . Thus
Pr
[∑
j Fj > (
1
2 +
ǫ
2 )T
]
< e−Tǫ
2/32n
, and the
result follows.
Appendix E: Omitted proofs from Sec-
tion 4.1
Proof (of Lemma 3.2). Let d′ be the single-
minded declaration for set Ai at value ti(Ai).
From the definition of regret minimization,
1
T
∑
t
ui(di
t,dt−i) ≥
1
T
∑
t
ui(d
′,dt−i)− o(1)
≥ 1
T
∑
t
(
ti(Ai)− θiA(Ai,dt−i)
)
− o(1)
= ti(Ai)− 1
T
∑
t
θi
A(Ai,dt−i)− o(1).
Since ui(dit,dt−i) ≤ ti(A(dt)) for all t, the result
follows.
Proof (of Lemma 4.3). We will prove the follow-
ing claim, which immediately implies the desired
result due to our assumption that the initial state
of best-response dynamics is the empty declaration
profile (which is separated):
Claim E.1. If d is separated, then it remains sep-
arated after a step of the best-response dynamics.
Suppose agent i is chosen to update his bid, say
from di to di′. Let d′ = (di′,d−i). If agent
i cannot improve his utility then d′ = d, so d′
is separated as required. Otherwise, he changes
the set upon which he bids from, say, Si to S′i.
Since ui(di′,d−i) > 0, it must be that di(Si) >∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj), which implies d
′ is separated
for agent i and di(Si) > dj(Sj) for all j such that
Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅. Hence, for all j 6= i, we have
Qj(d
′, Sj) ⊆ Qj(d, Sj). Thus, since d is sepa-
rated for all j 6= i, d′ must be separated for each
j 6= i as well.
Proof (of Proposition 4.5). Note that
θMsCAi (Ai,d−i) =
∑
j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj), so
agent i would obtain utility at least 12 ti(Ai) by
making a single-minded declaration for set Ai
at value ti(Ai). Thus his utility-maximizing
declaration must make at least this much utility,
and therefore is a bid for some set Si with
ti(Si) ≥ 12 ti(Ai). The result then follows from
Lemma 3.1.
Proof (of Lemma 4.6). We begin by showing that
SWMsCA(d) ≥ 12
∑
i di(Si). Recall that if
set Si is allocated by MsCA, then di(Si) ≥∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj). Let N ⊆ [n] be the set of
agents that receive non-empty sets in MsCA(d).
Proposition 4.4 implies that for all j ∈ [n] there is
some i ∈ N such that Si intersects Sj . Then∑
i
di(Si) =
∑
i∈N
di(Si) +
∑
i6∈N
di(Si)
≤ SWMsCA(d) +
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈Ri(d,Si)
dj(Sj)
≤ SWMsCA(d) +
∑
i∈N
di(Si)
= 2SWMsCA(d)
and therefore SWMsCA(d) ≥ 12
∑
i di(Si).
Now let G1 denote the set of agents for which
di(Si) ≥ 12 ti(Ai), and let G2 denote the set of
agents for which
∑
j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj) >
1
2 ti(Ai),
so that G = G1 ∪G2.
We note that SWMsCA(d) ≥ 12
∑
i di(Si) ≥
1
2
∑
i∈G1 di(Si) ≥ 14
∑
i∈G1 ti(Ai). Also,∑
i∈G2
∑
j∈Rj(d,Si) dj(Sj) ≥ 12
∑
i∈G2 ti(Ai).
Since Sj can intersect at most |Sj | ≤ s sets Ai, we
conclude s
∑
j dj(Sj) ≥ 12
∑
i∈G2 ti(Ai). This
implies (4s)SWMsCA(d) ≥
∑
i∈G2 ti(Ai).
We conclude (4s + 4)SWMsCA(d) ≥∑
i∈G1 di(Si) +
∑
i∈G2 di(Si), which implies the
desired result.
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 4.8
Recall the definition of a separated declaration
profile from our analysis of MsCA. Lemma 3.1
and Lemma 4.3 apply to MCA for the same rea-
sons as MsCA, so we will assume that all decla-
rations in an instance of best-response dynamics
are separated, and are single-minded declarations.
13
Also, we can assume that all single-minded decla-
rations are for sets that are either M or of size at
most
√
m, since these are the only sets allocated
byMCA.
Proposition F.1. If d is separated, then for all j
such that Sj 6= ∅, there exists some Si such that
di(Si) > dj(Sj), MCA allocates Si to agent i.
Proof. If MCA allocates M to some bidder than
the result is trivial, so suppose not. If Sj = M ,
then the result again follows trivially. If |Sj | ≤√
m, then, from the perspective of agent j, MCA
behaves precisely as M√mCA, so the result fol-
lows from Proposition 4.4.
Fix some separated declaration profile d. We
now wish to characterize the utility-maximizing
declarations of an agent i. We begin with the sim-
ple case of declarations for set M .
Lemma F.2. If SWMCA(∅,d−i) < 14 ti(M), then
the utility-maximizing bid for agent i, di, sets
di(Si) ≥ 12 ti(M) for some Si.
Proof. We claim that θMCAi (M,d−i) ≤ 12 ti(M).
To see this, observe that since SWMCA(∅,d−i) <
1
4 ti(M) and d is separated, it must be that no agent
(other than i) bid for M at a value greater than
1
4 ti(M), and that the sum of all bids for M (by
agents other than i) must be at most twice 14 ti(M).
The threshold amount for allocating M to a single
bidder can also be at most SWMCA(∅,d−i). So
θi
MCA(M,d−i) ≤ 2
(
1
4 ti(M)
)
as claimed.
This implies that agent i can make a utility of
1
2 ti(M) by bidding on set M . Thus his utility-
maximizing declaration must be a bid for a set Si
with ti(Si) ≥ 12 ti(M). The result then follows
from Lemma 3.1.
Next consider allocations of small sets. Let
A1, . . . , An be the optimal allocation of sets of size
at most
√
m. Recall the definition of Ri from our
analysis of MsCA in the previous section.
Lemma F.3. If ∑j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj) < 12 ti(Ai),
then the utility-maximizing bid for agent i, di, sets
di(Si) ≥ 12 ti(Ai) for some Si.
Proof (of Lemma F.3). Recall the definitions ofRi
and Qi from our analysis of MsCA in the previ-
ous section. For ease of notation we will write
SW√m for SWM√mCA in this proof. We begin
with a technical lemma that bounds the effect of
a single agent’s bid on the social welfare obtained
by MCA.
Claim F.4. Suppose d is separated and
M√mCA(d) allocates Si to agent i.
Then di(Si) −
∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj) ≤
SW√m(di,d−i)− SW√m(∅,d−i) ≤ di(Si).
Proof. Let T1, . . . , Tn be the sets allocated
in M√mCA(∅,d−i), and let U1, . . . , Un
be the sets allocated in M√mCA(di,d−i).
Thus SWM√mCA(di,d−i) =
∑
j dj(Uj) and
SWM√mCA(∅,d−i) =
∑
j dj(Tj).
Since Si is allocated to agent i, it must be that
di(Si) ≥
∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj). Let us first con-
sider the case that di(Si) =
∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj).
Note that, for any j, if Tj 6= ∅ and Uj = ∅, then
it must be that there exists some agent k such that
j ∈ Qk(d, Sk) and Uk 6= ∅ (by Proposition F.1).
Thus, summing over all j, it must be that∑
j
dj(Tj) ≤
∑
k
∑
j∈Qk(d,Sk)
dj(Tj)
≤
∑
k
dk(Uk).
(3)
Since Ui = Si, if we were to increase the
value of di(Si), this increases
∑
k dk(Uk) by the
same amount. Thus, if we write x = di(Si) −∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj), (3) becomes
∑
k dk(Uk) −
x ≥∑j dj(Tj). Rearranging gives ∑k dk(Uk)−∑
j dj(Tj) ≥ x = di(Si) −
∑
j∈Ri(d,Si) dj(Sj),
which gives one half of our desired inequality.
For the other inequality, suppose for contradic-
tion that SW√m(di,d−i) − SW√m(∅,d−i) >
di(Si). Define d′ by setting d′j = dj when
Sj∩Si = ∅, and d′j = ∅when Sj∩Si 6= ∅. That is,
d
′ is d with all bids intersecting Si removed. As
we showed in (3), replacing any winning bid with
∅ can only decrease the social welfare obtained by
M√mCA. This implies (by removing bids one at a
time) that SW√m(∅,d−i) ≥ SW√m(∅,d′−i).
Note that allocation M√mCA(di,d−i) is pre-
cisely {Si}∪M√mCA(∅,d′−i). We conclude that
SW√m(di,d−i) − SW√m(∅,d−i) = di(Si) −
(SW√m(∅,d−i) − SW√m(∅,d′−i)) ≤ di(Si),
as required. This completes the proof of Claim
F.4.
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We now proceed with the proof of Lemma F.3.
Suppose for contradiction that di is a bid for Si
with di(Si) < ti(Ai)/2. Then it must be that Si 6=
M , since ti(M) ≥ ti(Ai). Let di′ be the single-
minded bid for Ai at value ti(Ai).
We now consider cases depending on whether
not MCA(di,d−i) and/or MCA(di′,d−i) allo-
cate M to a single bidder. If MCA(di,d−i)
and MCA(di′,d−i) either both allocate M to
one agent, or neither do, then ui(di′,d−i) >
ui(di,d−i), a contradiction (where the case when
they both allocateM relies on the ǫ-possibility that
large bids are ignored).
Suppose MCA(di′,d−i) allocates M
to one agent, but MCA(di,d−i) does
not. Since neither Ai nor Si is M , it
must be that SWM√mCA(di
′,d−i) <
SWM√mCA(di,d−i). However, by Claim F.4,
SWM√mCA(di
′,d−i) − SWM√mCA(∅,d−i) ≥
di
′(Ai) −
∑
j∈Ri(d,Ai) dj(Sj) ≥ ti(Ai)/2,
and SWM√m(di,d−i) − SWM√m(∅,d−i) ≤
di(Si) < ti(Ai)/2. Thus SWM√mCA(di
′,d−i) ≥
SWM√mCA(di,d−i), a contradiction.
Suppose instead that MCA(di,d−i) allocates
M to one agent, but MCA(di′,d−i) does not.
Then it must be that agent i obtains utility at least
ti(Ai)/2 when bidding for di′, and (since Si 6=
M ) he obtains utility at most ǫti(Si) ≤ ǫti(Si)/2
when bidding for di. This contradicts the assumed
maximality of di. We have thus reached a contra-
diction in all cases.
We are now ready to complete the proof of The-
orem 4.8, in a manner similar to Theorem 4.7.
Proof (of Theorem 4.8). Since each dt is sepa-
rated, it is clear that SWMCA(dt) ≥ dti(Si) for
all t. Applying Lemma 4.2 to Lemma F.2 there-
fore implies that at for least (12 − ǫ)T steps of D,
SWMCA(d
t) ≥ 14 ti(M). We conclude that, with
probability at least 1 − ne−Tǫ2/32n, the average
welfare obtained byMCA is within a constant fac-
tor of maxi ti(M). It must therefore also be an
O(
√
m) approximation to the optimal welfare at-
tainable through any allocation of sets of size at
least
√
m (as there can be at most√m such sets in
any valid allocation).
Now let A1, . . . , An be any allocation of sets
of size at most
√
m, and for each t let Gt be the
set of agents for which either dit(Sti ) ≥ ti(Ai)/2
or
∑
j∈Ri(dt,Sti ) dj(S
t
j) ≥ 12 ti(Ai). Applying
Lemma 4.2 to Lemma F.2, we see that for each
agent i appears in Gt for at least (12 − ǫ)T time
steps, with probability at least 1 − ne−Tǫ2/32n.
The same argument as in the proof of Lemma
4.6 then demonstrates that MCA obtains an aver-
age O(
√
m) approximation to
∑
i ti(Ai), over the
steps of the best-response dynamics, with proba-
bility at least 1− ne−Tǫ2/32n.
Taking the union bound over the events de-
scribed above, we conclude that MCA obtains an
O(
√
m) approximation to any allocation of sets
with size at most
√
m, and an O(
√
m) approxima-
tion to any allocation of sets of size at least
√
m,
with probability at least 1− 2ne−Tǫ2/n. Since any
allocation is a combination of sets of size at most√
m and sets of size at least
√
m, we conclude that
SWMCA(D) ≥
(
1
O(
√
m)
− ǫ
)
SWopt(t) with
probability at least 1−2ne−Tǫ2/n, as required.
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